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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis analyzed the potential operational benefits and force structure 
reductions to the U.S. Combat Logistics Force provided by the single fuel concept (SFC).  
We used inventory pooling analysis to examine historical combatant demand patterns for 
F-76 and JP-5 to determine whether the SFC would expand afloat storage capacity and 
increase refueling logistics responsiveness through demand variability reduction across 
fleets.  We then developed an unclassified major combat operations (MCO) 
deterministic scenario involving multiple task groups within the U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command area of responsibility.  We used a steady-state model to calculate the number 
of shuttle ships and stations ships required to support the scenario using the SFC, as 
compared to F-76 and JP-5.  This thesis demonstrated adopting JP-5 as the Navy’s single 
fuel would increase maritime refueling service capacity at sea and reduce the number of 
ships required to support MCOs with long transit distances between defense fuel support 
points and the area of operations. 
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This thesis analyzed the potential operational benefits and force structure 
reductions to the U.S. Combat Logistics Force (CLF) provided by the Single Fuel 
Concept (SFC).  We used inventory pooling analysis to examine historical combatant 
demand patterns for F-76 and JP-5 to determine whether the SFC would expand afloat 
storage capacity and increase refueling logistics responsiveness through demand 
variability reduction across fleets.  We then developed an unclassified Major Combat 
Operations (MCO) deterministic scenario involving multiple task groups within the U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility.  We used a steady-
state model to calculate the number of shuttle ships and stations ships required to support 
the scenario using the SFC, as compared to F-76 and JP-5.  This thesis demonstrated 
adopting JP-5 as the Navy’s single fuel would increase maritime refueling service 
capacity at sea and reduce the number of ships required to support MCOs with long 
transit distances between Defense Fuel Support Points and the area of operations. 
In investigating the impact to maritime refueling operations through the adoption 
of JP-5 as the single fuel at sea, we address whether the SFC can enhance refueling 
logistics capabilities at operational and tactical levels of maritime warfare, by answering 
the following questions: 
1. Does the SFC improve afloat fuel inventory postures and reduce afloat 
fuel demand variability? 
2. How many shuttle and station ships are required to support proposed 
contingency operations within USINDOPACOM using the SFC, and does 
task force endurance increase, when compared to status quo? 
Our analysis shows that the SFC provides measurable operational benefits to the 
responsiveness and flexibility of maritime refueling logistics, primarily through enhanced 
CLF capacity to meet customer demand. Additionally, through recent historical analysis, 
it is estimated that all three primary refueling CLF classes and every numbered fleet 
would experience afloat storage capacity expansion through inventory pooling effects due 
xx 
to SFC implementation. Furthermore, under the SFC “Go Big” concept of operations, 
when compared to the dual fuel concept of operations the Navy currently operates under, 
fewer fleet oilers and tankers would be required to provide the same level of service and 
logistics refueling capability during high-intensity operations, and task force endurance 
would be increased.  
The following are the results of our analysis: 
1. Inventory pooling effects would improve T-AKE refueling capacity by 
20.29 percent, and 12.32 percent for T-AOs. 
2. The SFC yields the equivalent additional storage capacity of 1.94 T-AKEs 
and 1.31 T-AOs, worth $1.61 billion in cost-avoidance. 
3. Every number fleet would experience demand variability reduction and 
improved refueling service capability and responsiveness. 
4. We estimate that MSC port visits could have been reduced from anywhere 
between 4 to 31 fewer annually. 
5. Modeled T-AO and tanker requirements to support task group operations 
were reduced by one each. 
6. Modeled task group endurance would increase by up to three days and 
operational range expands up to 1,080 nmi without sacrificing combatant 




The Secretary of the Navy’s 2019 Operational Energy Goals tasked the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) to 
enhance the lethality and effectiveness of forces through energy resilience, operational 
reach, and time-on-station (TOS) for forward-presence naval forces (Department of the 
Navy [DoN], 2019). Important to this effort is the sustainment and enhancement of the 
Navy’s primary maritime fuel logistics transportation and delivery capability, the Combat 
Logistics Force (CLF). This thesis aims to detail the inherent operational benefits provided 
by supply chain simplification via the Single Fuel Concept (SFC). 
A. SINGLE FUEL CONCEPT
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) consumed 85 million barrels
(bbls) of fuel in fiscal year (FY) 2018, totaling $9.1 billion in annual expenditures, 
supporting the operational energy demands of all military components making it the largest 
user of energy in the world (Office of the Under Secretary Defense for Acquisition and 
Sustainment, 2019). The report goes on to note that DoD is challenged in meeting its 
operational energy strategy goals because multiple fuels contain unique characteristics 
required by different DoD components. Additionally, DoD components are required to 
“minimize the types of bulk petroleum products that must be stocked and distributed, plan 
to use fuels readily available worldwide, and minimize the military-unique characteristics 
of DoD fuels” (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2017, p. I.2). Also, in line with JCS guidance, 
the DoN Business Operations Plan: Agility and Accountability Fiscal Year 2020–2022 
(2019), outlined strategic plans to improve business processes and “provid [e] forces with 
the right fuel, in the right place, at the right time,” (JCS, 2017, p. I.1) and minimize the 
impact of military-unique DoD requirements. Therefore, the SFC has the possibility to 
meet these goals by reducing the number of bulk petroleum products stored and distributed, 
while still meeting various unique DoN requirements. 
Currently, the Navy uses two types of fuel at sea, Naval Distillate Fuel (F-76) for 
ship’s propulsion aboard conventionally powered ships, and Jet Propulsion – 5 (JP-5) for 
naval aircraft (Tosh et al., 1992). Prior to the late 1960s, the Navy used three types of fuels: 
Navy Special Fuel Oil (NSFO) for steam boiler plants, Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) for 
combustion engines, and Jet Propulsion-5 (JP-5) fuel for Navy aircraft. In 1967, there was 
a motivation within the Navy to adopt JP-5 as a single fuel at sea (Tosh et al., 1992). In 
contrast, this strategy was discarded because the cost of JP-5 at that time was double the 
standard price of NSFO, and it was doubtful that existing worldwide JP-5 refining capacity 
could meet the projected demand. Thus, multiple fuel utilization continued for powering 
all non-nuclear ships. 
According to research conducted by Garrett (1993), the first motivation for having 
a single fuel on the battlefield for the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force (USAF) was in 1986. 
Originally, Jet Propulsion-4 (JP-4) was used for powering aircraft, and diesel engines of 
nearly all tactical ground vehicles and equipment (V/E). Then, in 1988, after a series of 
tests and demonstrations at Fort Bliss to confirm the usability of Jet Propulsion-8 (JP-8), 
the USAF, Army, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) embraced JP-8 as the 
single fuel, replacing JP-4 and No. 2 diesel fuel. Despite JP-8 being suitable as a single 
fuel for both aviation and ground use, it is not suitable for maritime use and storage in naval 
vessels. The primary reason is its lower flash point when compared to JP-5, which will be 
discussed in detail in Background: Fuel Descriptions and Characteristics. 
Subsequently, in light of this success using a single fuel on the battlefield for land-
based applications, the Navy revisited the SFC (Tosh et al., 1992). In this study, Belvoir 
Fuels and Lubricants Research Facility (BFLRF) in San Antonio, Texas, recommended a 
similar policy for the Navy to adopt JP-5. This was due to several benefits, including, 
“[ease] for tanker and oiler crews in tank cleaning and purging between loads; less 
possibility of inter-fuel contamination; and less bookkeeping on fuel rotation, etc.” (p. 16). 
The study concluded that converting to “JP-5 would not be detrimental to fleet 
operational readiness” (p. 26). However, due to the F-76 and JP-5 price differential—
then five cents—researchers also identified a projected seven percent annual 
fuel cost increase, approximately $103 million per year. More recently, a thesis by 




Beginning in 2017, the price differential changed, closing to one cent per gallon, 
which will remain steady through September 30, 2020, according to McCusker (2019). 
Although it is hard to determine if the price differential will continue, today, the U.S. is the 
largest global crude oil producer and JP-5 refiner, enabling domestic control of price and 
production to support DoD operational energy demands (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration [EIA], 2018). 
B. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In investigating the impact to maritime refueling operations through the adoption
of JP-5 as the single fuel at sea, we address whether the SFC can enhance refueling logistics 
capabilities at operational and tactical levels of maritime warfare, by answering the 
following questions: 
1. Does the SFC improve afloat fuel inventory postures and reduce afloat
fuel demand variability?
2. How many shuttle and station ships are required to support proposed
contingency operations within U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM) using the SFC, and does task force endurance
increase, when compared to status quo?
4 




This chapter provides the reader with a general understanding of maritime fuel
logistics necessary to assess the impact of the SFC on afloat fuel inventory postures and 
CLF force structure. Specifically, this chapter contains information on future operational 
strategy, the fuel logistics supply chain, and types of fuel used by the DoD. 
B. KEY SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
1. Distributed Maritime Operations
In December 2018, CNO Admiral John Richardson, in Design for Maintaining 
Maritime Superiority 2.0 (Design 2.0) (2018), proposed Large Scale Exercise (LSE) 2020 
to test the effectiveness of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO); the focus of LSE is to 
conduct simulated major combat operations (MCOs) at the fleet level using multiple carrier 
strike groups (CSGs) and other military components spread over a vast area. The planned 
LSE will occur between Guam and Hawaii (Werner, 2019), and as Admiral Richardson 
indicates, the exercise is similar to the Valiant Shield and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 
exercises in the USINDOPACOM AOR, which tests our different military branches’ 
wargame capabilities in response to a wide range of missions at sea, in the air, and on land. 
According to Design 2.0, “the logistics capabilities needed to refuel, rearm, resupply, and 
repair our operational forces” in support of LSE are paramount to sustaining the fight 
(CNO, 2018, p. 6). Design 2.0 goes on to prioritize developing options for more agile and 
resilient refueling capabilities to strengthen our Naval power projection through DMO. 
Therefore, the SFC is one option that would provide enhanced inventory postures and 
improved responsiveness in support of DMO, by simplifying the fuel supply chain with 
identical or reduced maritime refueling logistics force structure. 
2. Naval Refueling Behavior
Navy Warfare Publication: (NWP) Navy Planning defines an “operations order 
(OPORD) [as] a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the 
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purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.” (DoN, 2013, p. 6.4). It 
goes on to explain that OPORDs allow for commander discretion in carrying out prescribed 
orders to best accomplish mission objectives. For example, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(COMPACFLT) OPORD 201 Annex D, which is nearly identical to most other Fleet 
commander OPORD guidance for fuel, directs naval vessels to fill their fuel tanks at any 
practicable and available opportunity (2015). This applies to both end-user combatant 
vessels as well as the CLF, as this requirement is intended to maintain CLF and combatant 
storage levels to their fullest. While this increases the frequency between refueling events 
in peacetime, it is meant to ensure that in emergency or contingency situations, stocks are 
already replenished, and TOS and the available time between future refueling events are 
extended. This is most notable during warfare operations in contested environments. Since 
the directive provides commanding officers and ship masters with the operational 
flexibility to best decide when to refuel, as opposed to mandated inviolate tank levels or 
scheduled periodicities, average afloat fuel inventory levels are not solely influenced by 
vessel-specific consumption rates. Instead, varying individual risk tolerances and 
behavioral patterns, in response to situation-specific requirements, are also influential in 
determining average fuel inventory postures. 
C. MARITIME FUEL LOGISTICS KEY PLAYERS 
1. DLA Energy 
According to Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy’s factsheet, the agency is 
responsible for sourcing, distributing, and storing fuel in support of DoD requirements 
around the world (2020). The factsheet goes on to state that DoD petroleum supply chains 
traditionally begin with domestic and international fuel contracts; specifically, for the 
Navy’s supply chain, DLA Energy contracts were used to procure 9.14 million bbls of JP-
5 and 43.1 million bbls of F-76. Terminal operations are next in the chain, with 597 
worldwide Defense Fuel Support Points (DFSP), which include ashore facilities and afloat 
tankage within the hulls of MSC’s CLF vessels (2020). Finally, DLA Energy’s 
responsibility typically ends at tactical distribution, such as an underway replenishment 
(UNREP) between CLF vessels and combatants. 
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2. Military Sealift Command 
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the U.S. “will maintain a 
forward military presence capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating any adversary 
[in the Indo-Pacific area of operational responsibility (AOR)]” (White House, 2017, p. 47). 
To achieve these ends, U.S. military planners require operational strategies capable of 
projecting military forces into contested environments over 5,000 nautical miles (nmi) 
from the contiguous United States. The means often used to achieve these ends are large, 
fuel hungry CSGs, as shown in Figure 1, which constitute the majority of sea-going 
military forces. A typical CSG is composed of one Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carrier 
(CVN) and her associated air wing, composed of 70 aircraft, one Ticonderoga class guided-
missile cruiser (CG), several Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), an 
attack submarine, and one Fast Combat Support Ship (T-AOE). Additionally, to meet the 
multi-product demands of a CSG, it is necessary to maintain robust, reliable, and 
uninterrupted lines of communication (LOCs) comprised of supplies, ammunition, and 
fuel. The primary means to support fuel LOCs is the Military Sealift Command’s (MSC) 
CLF. 
 
Figure 1. CSG-5 and flagship, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) on patrol in 
the Indo-Pacific AOR. Source: Commander, U.S. 7TH Fleet 
(2016). 
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a. Fleet Replenishment Oiler 
The backbone of the CLF’s fuel delivery capabilities is met by 15 Henry J. Kaiser 
Class fleet replenishment oilers T-AOs, as shown in Figure 2 (MSC, 2020a). According to 
NWP: Sustainment at Sea (DoN, 2007), T-AOs provide underway replenishment fuel to 
U.S. Navy ships at sea and aircraft assigned to aircraft carriers. Generally, fleet 
replenishment oilers come in two variants, single hull and double hulled. Currently, the 
Navy has three ships (T-AO 201, 203 and 204) equipped with double hulls to comply with 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. As a result, the single-hull variant possesses a 90,260 bbls 
storage capacity for each product; whereas, the double hull configuration only possesses 
77,160 bbls of storage capacity for each product. Both port and starboard sides of the ship 
have refueling stations enabling UNREP of two ships simultaneously, pumping up to 
28,571 bbls of F-76 and 17,142 bbls of JP-5 per hour. The ship can steam up to 20 knots 
(kn) with a maximum operational range of 3,000 nmi. Additionally, T-AOs have the 
capability to perform fuel consolidated logistics (CONSOL) operations with both long-
term and short-term charted commercial tankers (T-AOTs), significantly extending fuel 
LOCs. 
 
Figure 2. USNS Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO 187), the lead ship of her class. 
Source: MSC (2020b). 
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b. Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo 
The fourteen ships in the Lewis and Clark Class (T-AKE) were constructed to 
provide multi-product cargo and ammunition UNREP capability to U.S. Navy ships and 
aircraft assigned to aircraft carriers (MSC, 2020c), as shown in Figure 3. According to 
(DoN, 2007), out of the 14 ships of her class, 12 are designated to provide multi-product 
support to the Navy fleet while 2 ships are designated to provide support to USMC at sea 
as part of the Maritime Prepositioning Force. While it was not primarily designed as a fuel 
carrying vessel, it does possess a cargo F-76 capacity of 7,000 bbls and a JP-5 capacity of 
17,000 bbls, and the ship can steam up to 20 kn with a maximum operational range of 
14,000 nmi. In contemporary operations, the T-AKEs operate in conjunction with the T-
AOs to provide station ship logistics to CSGs. 
 
Figure 3. USNS Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14) performing UNREP operations. 
Source: MSC (2020d). 
c. Fast Combat Support Ship 
Similar to T-AKEs, the two ships of the Supply Class (T-AOE) were constructed 
to provide rapid multi-product cargo and ammunition UNREP to U.S. Navy ships and 
aircraft assigned to aircraft carriers (DoN, 2007), as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, T-
AOEs can receive ammunition, food, repair parts, store items, and fuel from shuttle ships 
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while simultaneously redistributing these cargos to U.S. combatants. This unique 
capability reduces the amount of time combatants are alongside; therefore, reducing their 
vulnerability to attack in a contested environment. According to NWP: Sustainment at Sea 
(DoN, 2007), it can steam up to 25 kn, necessary to keep pace with CSG flanking speed, 
with a maximum operational radius of 3,000 nmi, and can carry 2,150 tons of ammunition, 
500 tons of dry stores, 250 tons of refrigerated stores, and more than 177,000 bbls of oil. 
 
Figure 4. USNS Rainer (T-AOE 7) underway in the Indo-Pacific AOR. 
Source: DoN (2020). 
d. Petroleum Tankers 
Six T-AOT Tankers under MSC’s Combatant Command Support program, as 
showcased in Figure 5, deliver petroleum products to DFSPs worldwide (MSC, 2020e). 
According to NWP: Sustainment at Sea (DoN, 2007), T-AOTs have an operational range 




Figure 5. MT Empire State (T-AOT 5193) MSC tanker conducts sea trials 
off the coast of San Diego. Source: Seal (2000). 
Currently, there are two U.S. flag vessels in the U.S. Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) Maritime Security Program (MSP) (M. Sweeney, email to authors, March 17, 
2020). As of March 12, 2020, according to MARAD data statistics, the U.S. currently has 
99 tankers eligible for MSP recruitment (Vough, n.d.). According to Sweeney, this program 
provides DoD access to a versatile fleet of government-owned/controlled or privately-
owned, U.S.-flagged vessels that are ready to support a global, intermodal transportation 
network of terminals, facilities, and logistics management services. Such long-range 
tankers can carry from 310,000 bbls up to 615,000 bbls of petroleum products (EIA, 2014). 
D. FUEL CHARACTERISTICS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
1. Flash Point 
Flash point is the lowest temperature at which vapors will ignite by an ignition 
source (DA, 2015). Therefore, the lower the flash point, the more vulnerable combatant 
ships are to fire and mishaps. 
2. Explosive Range 
The Army Techniques Publication 4–43 (ATP 4-43) states that “a mixture’s lower 
explosive limit is formed at about the product’s flash point” (2015, p. 3.3). As fuel and air 
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are mixed, a possibly explosive or flammable mixture is created. Any mixture above the 
upper explosive limit (UEL) value for the gas/vapor is rich to ignite and explode, and any 
mixture below the lower explosive limit (LEL) is lean and will not ignite, as there is not 
enough fuel present in the air to burn (DA, 2015). Explosive ranges vary among fuel types 
and a mixture within the explosive range ignites when in contact with an ignition source. 
ATP 4-43 goes on to state that “in open spaces, this causes an intense fire. In enclosed 
spaces, such as an empty tanker, the mixture explodes… The key point is that an empty or 
nearly empty petroleum tank, or container is still dangerous due to remaining fuel vapors” 
(p. 3.3). 
3. Volumetric Density 
A defining characteristic of fuel types per American Petroleum Institute (API) 
standards is volumetric density, or the API gravity of a standard mass per volume, at a 
constant temperature, expressed as kg/L at 15°C (59°C). 
4. Energy Density 
Individual fuel types have specific energy density profiles. Energy density is a 
measure of the net heat production at the moment of combustion, or the stored potential 
energy in a standard mass, expressed as megajoules per kg (MJ/kg). 
5. Jet Fuel Additives 
Additives in government-owned, military-grade jet fuel stocks can be included 
during the refining process or injected in pipeline or during discharge at the DFSP (DA, 
2015). The standard military-grade additive package for the majority of jet fuels used by 
DoD include Fuel System Icing Inhibitor (FSII), Static Dissipative Additive (SDA), and 
Corrosive Inhibitor/Lubricity Improver. First, FSII is an anti-icing additive that reduces the 
freezing point of water to prevent the formation of ice crystals in fuel lines, which reduces 
the flow of fuel to the engine (DA, 2015). Additionally, FSII aides in the removal of 
entrained water molecules during filtration. Second, SDA increases a fuel’s electrical 
conductivity, thereby reducing its likelihood of electrostatic buildup and resultant 
explosive hazards (DA, 2015). Therefore, this is especially important for the safe operation 
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of rotary wing aircraft during “hot” refueling. Lastly, CI/LI contains an active ingredient 
called dimer of linoleic acid that “has been shown to reduce corrosion and improve 
lubricity” in “dryer” fuels (Johnson et al., 2014). Therefore, CI/LI adds lubricity on roller 
bearings when pumping fuel and an effective anti-corrosion agent in fuel line tubing. 
E. FUEL TYPES 
1. Fuel Oils 
The ATP describes fuel oil as a petroleum product obtained through distillation, 
varying in type as a distillate or as a residual oil classified by different numerical fuel grades 
(2015). As the ATP states, “the term fuel oil is also used in a stricter sense to refer only to 
the heaviest commercial fuel that can be obtained from crude oil… Broadly speaking, fuel 
oil is any liquid petroleum product that is burned in a furnace or boiler for the generation 
of heat or used in an engine for the generation of power” (p. 3.1). While fuel oils are 
generally stable with safe flash points and explosive ranges, they are not suitable for 
aviation use due to their higher freeze and cloud points. For example, F-76’s cloud point is 
-1°C (30°C) (DoD, 2014), which would invite clogging in fuel injection systems at low 
ambient temperatures, which are present at high altitudes, due to paraffin wax 
crystallization and coagulation. 
a. Marine Gas Oil  
Marine Gas Oil (MGO) is approved for use as an alternative bunker fuel [in naval 
vessels] only when F-76 is not available (Sermarini, 2000, p. 11). Additionally, this type 
of fuel is not stable over the long-term and must be used before sludge forms in storage 
tanks, thus requiring considerable filtration. In a telephone conversation with the Energy 
Plans and Policy Branch, Deputy CNO, Sermarini quotes Roberts (personal 
communication to author, February 17, 2000) as stating that “Coast Guard maintenance 
personnel believe that continuous and long-term use of MGO results in greater wear and 
higher maintenance costs than when F-76 is used” (p. 12). 
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b. Diesel Fuel 
Diesel fuel is a predominant fuel used in an internal compression engine where 
ignition of the fuel takes place as a result of elevated air temperature in the tank compressed 
by the piston (Garrett, 1993). Diesel fuel has a flash point of 52°C (126°F), which is lower 
than F-76 (Monroe, 2016). The most common type of diesel fuel is No. 2 diesel, or DF-2, 
a middle-distillate used for automobile diesel and gas turbine engines. 
c. F-76 
Naval distillate fuel, F-76, previously known DFM, is the MIL-SPEC distillate fuel 
equivalent to No. 2 diesel and delivered on the ship by fleet oilers for ships’ boilers and 
diesel engines (DoD, 2014). F-76’s density at 15°C (59°F) is between 0.800 kg/L 
minimum, and 0.876 kg/L maximum (DoD, 2014). Its flash point is 60°C (140°F) like JP-
5, and its explosive range is narrow at 0.6 LEL and 6.5 UEL. (CITGO Petroleum 
Corporation, 2016). Like JP-5, F-76 must meet tight storage stability requirements. 
Notably, MIL-DTL-16884N does not require a minimum heating value for F-76. 
However, MIL-DTL-16884N Appendix A does provide a minimum heating value by mass 
of 43.5 MJ/kg for a related product, Synthesized Paraffinic Diesel (DoD, 2014). This 
product is dissimilar to F-76 in several ways and thus, a more accurate representation of F-
76’s heating value required research beyond MIL-DTL standards. 
A Naval Fuels & Lubricants Cross Functional Team (NF&L CFT) report detailed 
fit-for-purpose analysis on traditionally refined F-76 and a potential alternative, Direct 
Sugar to Hydrocarbon F-76 (DSH-76), colloquially known as “bio diesel,” (Weisser & 
Turgeon, 2013). The report’s analysis used 43 MJ/kg as the required minimum heating 
value benchmark when comparing the two products, which was higher than the observed 
average 42.7 MJ/kg F-76 sample result. 
2. Kerosene Fuels 
Kerosene is a mid-weight liquid hydrocarbon chain that is light in color and was 
once used primarily for lighting in cities before mass electrification (Green, 2017). Today, 
kerosene is primarily refined into jet fuel, designed for use in gas turbine engine powered 
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aircraft (DA, 2015). Additionally, kerosene products are less volatile and safer to store and 
transport than Naphtha products, like gasoline, which has a -43°C (-45°F) flashpoint. 
a. JP-4 
JP-4 fuel is a 30 percent kerosene, 70 percent gasoline mixture with a large 
concentration of light liquid hydrocarbon chains and weighs less than kerosene, which is a 
desirable characteristic for aviation (Deziel, 2019). Additionally, it has a low flash point of 
-23ºC (-9°F), which makes it less safe to store than other jet fuels, but its low freezing point 
of -58ºC (-72°F) makes it advantageous for use in exceedingly cold environments. 
Furthermore, JP-4 has a 1.3 percent LEL and 8 percent UEL (Product Safety and 
Toxicology Group, 2016). Due to JP-4’s low flash point and relatively wide explosive 
range, it is unsafe for storage at sea. 
b. JP-8 
JP-8 is a widely used complete kerosene blend that is the least expensive for DoD 
to procure and viewed as an acceptable substitute for No. 2 diesel (Deziel, 2019). 
Additionally, it is nearly identical to commercial jet fuel variants but includes the standard 
military fuel additive package. Furthermore, JP-8 has a minimum flash point of 38ºC 
(100°F), and a minimum energy density of 42.8 MJ/kg, which is slightly higher than JP-5 
(DoD, 2015). As JP-8 is cheaper to produce, has an identical explosive range, and stores 
more potential energy than JP-5, it would seem to be a suitable substitute for maritime 
aviation. However, while JP-8’s flash point is still lower than that of JP-5 or F-76 and is 
less safe to store at sea. 
c. JP-5 
JP-5 is a kerosene-based jet fuel first developed in 1952 for use in aircraft aboard 
naval vessels (Hemighaus et al., 2007) By definition, JP-5’s density at 15°C (59°F) is 
between 0.788 kg/L minimum and 0.845 kg/L maximum and its energy density must meet 
or exceed 42.6 MJ/kg (DoD, 2016a). Amerada goes on to state that both JP-8 and JP-5 have 
the same explosive range of 0.7 percent LEL and 5 percent UEL. 
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The most significant distinction of between JP-5 and all other jet fuels is its high 
flash point of 60°C (140°F). This distinction makes it safe for use on aircraft carrier flight 
decks, where ambient temperatures can often exceed 38ºC (100°F) (Sermarini, 2000). In 
turn, F-76 cannot be safely used in aircraft. For these reasons, JP-5 is the only acceptable 
substitute for F-76 and historical operations confirm its versatility. Additionally, in 1982 
and 1983, during the Iranian crisis, which restricted access to F-76 stores and shipping 
lanes through the Persian Gulf, JP-5 was used in lieu of F-76 onboard navy vessels in the 
Indian Ocean without any documented negative consequences (Tosh et al., 1992). 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following sections detail prior research and studies related to this thesis. It 
begins by detailing the Army’s successful transition to a single fuel on the battlefield 
demonstrating simplified fuel logistics and greater service interoperability. Then, we 
examine research into energy requirements within USINDOPACOM AOR and the DoD’s 
ability to meet them with anticipated force structure and resourcing. Next, we include 
studies into the cost, operational impacts, and feasibility of the Navy converting to the SFC, 
and selected associated counterarguments. Finally, we close by specifying how our thesis 
will contribute to this field of work. 
A. SINGLE FUEL ON THE BATTLEFIELD 
The executive research project by Garrett (1993) discusses how both the USAF and 
U.S. Army came to adopt JP-8 as the single fuel on the battlefield due to separately 
encountered problems. The initial impetus for adopting JP-8 started in 1986 when the 
USAF and Army agreed to investigate substituting JP-8 for JP-4 and No. 2 diesel. 
According to Garrett, USAF had determined that JP-4, which has a low flash point, was 
unsafe and volatile for continued use in their aircraft. Garrett goes on to describe how the 
U.S. Army’s experienced wax crystallization buildup at low temperatures in No. 2 diesel, 
which clogged fuel lines and caused engine failure in M-1 tanks. 
Likewise, in 1988, the U.S. Army Energy Office and the Belvoir Research, 
Development, and Engineering Center (BRDEC) conducted a comprehensive test and 
demonstration of JP-8 involving 2,800 diesel-powered V/E and consumed over 110,000 
bbls (Butler et al., 1990). The purpose of the demonstration program was to observe 
compatibility of JP-8; identify mechanical issues; and monitor changes in fuel 
consumption. Similarly, a separate laboratory evaluation conducted by BRDEC in 1988 to 
test acceptability and endurance of JP-8 fuel in comparison to No. 2 diesel (Likos et al., 
1988). Both demonstrations and laboratory tests revealed no significant impacts on V/E 
and no significant problems in any engine attributable to JP-8. However, some 
recommendations were presented that a further study must be conducted on the injection 
18 
equipment to determine its durability at the maximum fuel temperature when using JP-8, 
and the development of new operation manual for proper handling of JP-8 and maintenance 
schedules of V/E.  
Subsequently, in 1990, the Army and USAF adopted JP-8 as the SFC on the 
battlefield, but the Navy abstained because of the flash point issue (Garrett, 1993). Despite 
skepticism of using JP-8 due to minor mechanical problems encountered by U.S. Army 
personnel, some advantages were observed on the battlefield such as increased 
survivability when USAF shifted from JP-4 to JP-8, and simplified fuel logistics when U.S. 
Army converted from No. 2 diesel to JP-8 as they used this oil for both M-1 and helicopters. 
Those minor mechanical problems were assessed by BRDEC and found insufficient 
evidence or no significant mechanical problems of using JP-8. Finally, both branches 
achieved the DoD’s goal to simplify fuel logistics operations on the battlefield and 
interoperability within our military components including our NATO allies (Le Pera, 
2005).  
B. REFINED FUEL WITHIN THE INDO-PACIFIC AOR 
Folster et al. (2018) developed a model to estimate the number of commercial 
tankers available for charter to transport fuel to DFSPs within the USINDOPACOM AOR 
within a given week. Their model computed a mean, a minimum, and maximum of four, 
two, and seven tankers respectively available for charter on any given week. Then, they 
computed the number of tankers required to support a major contingency using Desert 
Storm daily fuel demand as their proxy. Next, using a daily demand of 56,000 metric tons 
(MT), a cycle-time of 18 days (loading/unloading/transportation time) between three major 
USINDOPACOM DFSPs, and an average tanker capacity of 36,000 MT, they computed 
11 tankers per week were required to support fuel requirements. Using this information, 
together with the amount of tankers their model computed were available for charter in the 
USINDOPACOM area, their model was used to determine potential charter tanker 
shortfalls. By comparing the estimated amount of tankers available for charter against 
Desert Storm weekly tanker requirements, this demonstrated fuel shortfalls in every major 
contingency scenario evaluated. 
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C. OPERATIONAL IMPACT STUDY 
The Single Naval Fuel at Sea Feasibility Study – Phase Two Results final report 
(Williams & Leung, 2011) details the findings of previous studies pertaining to seven 
primary focus areas related to SFC implementation, the first of which was the operational 
impacts of the SFC. The report states that SFC implementation would fail to yield any 
significant operational benefits, and the claim was based on the findings from the 
Alternative Fuels Study Final Report Unclassified Version (U), conducted by Systems 
Planning and Analysis, Inc. (SPA) (D. Saks, personal communication, April 7, 2020). 
The SPA analysis used a linear program to determine the minimum T-AO presence 
required to meet combatant demand, during peacetime operations within the three AORs. 
The study’s MCO scenario models were constructed using steady-state surge requirements 
in the same three AORs. In each model iteration, the study assumed that at least three 
DFSPs were accessible and would remain uncontested, that no tankers were required, with 
T-AOs serving as shuttle ships, and that there was no variability in demand. Therefore, the 
study’s results showed that proximity to DFSPs within the AOR was the primary driver for 
CLF composition. The study also concluded that the only combatants projected to 
experience positive endurance effects under the SFC were amphibious platforms with 
aviation operations capabilities. As described later in Recommendations, this result is due 
to the relatively large JP-5 storage tanks aboard amphibious warfare platforms, designed 
to service sustained aerial warfare operations.  
D. UNIVERSAL FUEL AT SEA 
A Naval Postgraduate School thesis entitled The Universal Fuel at Sea: Replacing 
F-76 with JP-5 lists key maritime fuel logistics enablers inherent in the SFC (Sermarini, 
2000). It showed that first, the SFC would provide greater flexibility in UNREP and 
CONSOLs between various CLF assets could be achieved through the use of a single 
product. Secondly, this work detailed that any efficiencies which the SFC can provide are 
warranted, as the MSC long-term chartered tanker fleet shrunk from 21 to five in the decade 
preceding 2000. Lastly, Sermarini points out that the U.S. has increasingly relied on 
foreign-flagged tankers for strategic petroleum lift transportation to DFSPs during both 
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peacetime and contingency operations. Thus, in future conflicts, these foreign assets could 
be restricted from U.S. use by their respective governments, and thus, any added flexibility 
afforded by the SFC might prove critical for sustained operations. 
E. TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY COUNTERARGUMENTS 
In speaking with fuel professionals during our data collection efforts, several 
potential impediments to SFC implementation were mentioned. Below are brief 
descriptions of previous research and analysis conducted on the most notable topics. 
1. Engine Performance and Wear 
Lubricity has been thoroughly analyzed as a potential impediment to using JP-5 in 
F-76 based systems. Lubricity is a function of viscosity but not a measurable property 
(Wilson, 1996). Therefore, to determine a fluid’s lubricity, test wear scarring patterns are 
compared to those produced from fluids with the same viscosity. Often, fluids with 
different densities will also have different viscosities. Additionally, the rates of change in 
viscosity between two fluids can vary at matching temperatures. Thus, viscosity 
requirements are the desired coating behavior of a fluid within a desired operating 
temperature range. 
In terms of lubricity, the Belvoir Fuels and Lubricants Research Facility (BFLRF) 
detailed how kerosene-derived fuels, such as JP-5, provide less lubricity than F-76 (Tosh 
et al., 1992). The report goes on to describe that diesel engine components are 
manufactured with less restrictive spacing tolerances than are turbine engines and therefore 
are prone to surface contact between internal moving parts such as fuel injection valve 
components and cylinder walls and pistons. F-76 then provides inherent protection against 
friction and scarring. 
In regard to viscosity, JP-5’s must not exceed 7.0 mm2/s at -20°C (-4°F) (DoD, 
2016a). Required F-76 viscosity at 40°C (104°F) must remain between 1.7 mm2/s and 4.3 
mm2/s (DoD, 2014). DoD is therefore concerned with JP-5’s performance in turbines at 
great altitudes and low ambient temperatures, and with F-76’s performance at sea level, 
where it is not nearly as cold and in turbines that operate for longer durations. By 
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comparison, JP-8’s required viscosity must not exceed 8.0 mm2/s at -20°C (-4°F) (DoD, 
2015). ASTM D975 requires viscosity at 40°C (104°F) for No. 2 diesel, must be at least 1.9 
mm2/s and must not exceed 4.1 mm2/s (ASTM, 2019). This means that by acceptable 
tolerances, JP-5 is more viscous and provides more lubricity than JP-8, and should be 
acceptable for use in F-76 engines. 
A BFLRF report also details the inconsequential differences in performance and 
wear in either diesel engines or previously JP-4 propelled turbine engines upon conversion 
to JP-8 during field tests (Butler et al., 1990). Thus, the Army concluded that any harm 
incurred by using JP-8 in diesel engines was not significant enough to prevent widespread 
use of JP-8 as a preferred substitute according to its Single Fuel Forward initiative. 
Likewise, a Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD) impact 
study details the effects of JP-5 usage on existing diesel engines in naval service at the time 
(Guimond, 2007). It concluded that preliminary studies showed minimal negative effects 
on diesel engines and recommended follow-on studies for newer, small diesel engines 
coming into service and on LCS class engines. It also recommended that extended JP-5 use 
trials be conducted on diesel engines to verify the findings of limited use trials. The impact 
study also drew on numerous instances of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter usage of JP-5 for 
extended periods of time with no meaningful reports of damage or negative maintenance 
or performance results. 
Similarly, in a letter from the Technical Warrant Holder, Diesel Engines to 
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), JP-5 use was recommended in 
LCS classes 1 and 3, both containing Diesel Main Propulsion Engines and auxiliary 
Services Diesel Generators (Pogarty, 2014). The technical warrant holder concluded that 
mishap frequency would remain rare and the resulting risk to the engines or generators low. 
In addition, in response to previous inquiries on the effect of JP-5 use in smaller naval 
diesel engines, a NF&L CFT report details the results of High Frequency Reciprocating 
Rig and Wear Scar Diameter tests on such engines (2018). It concluded that no negative 
performance results or any increased engine wear beyond original equipment manufacturer 
tolerances were observed due to JP-5 usage. 
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Lastly, a NSWCCD study detailed the impacts of using JP-5 in F-76 powered naval 
boiler platforms (Rebold, 2004). The study concluded that long term JP-5 use would 
produce no negative effects and limited performance degradation. 
2. Preventive Maintenance and Filtration 
In general, JP-5 burns cleaner and maintains overall fuel storage and piping system 
cleanliness better than F-76. Thus, there are preventative maintenance benefits to utilizing 
JP-5 in F-76 systems. For example, the boiler study showed cleaner firesides and would 
dramatically reduce man-hours for cleaning (Rebold, 2004). The study goes on to show 
that due to less frequent presence of entrained water in JP-5 than in F-76, flaking rust within 
piping systems was also reduced and therefore JP-5 usage was found to reduce instances 
of plugging in narrow diameter pipes such as injections points. Additionally, a Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) report showed that JP-5 usage in ship’s propulsion gas 
turbine engines produced significant savings in consumable components within filtration 
systems (2006). The report showed a marginal decrease in the number of filter changes in 
centrifugal purifier systems, a 68 percent reduction in pre-filter element changes, and a 72 
percent reduction in filter/particle separator element changes. 
3. Ship Stability Profiles 
It is known that a ship’s center of gravity (KG) is defined as the pivot point about 
which a ship will heel, or roll laterally due to wind or wave action while floating (Barrass, 
2004). To that extent, a ship’s basal KG is inherent to its design and will not change unless 
structural alterations were made to the ship, i.e., increasing the height of the mast would 
make it top-heavy and elevate its KG, or deepening the keel would lower its KG. 
Furthermore, a ship will become less stable and more prone to heeling if it is laden with 
weight above its KG or by lightening the weight of its load below the KG. For naval 
combatants, heeling is particularly important as these ships are more likely to conduct 
dynamic maneuvers in response to battle conditions than are commercial cargo and 
passenger vessels. 
Specifically, NAVSEAINST 9096.3E, Weight and Moment Compensation and 
Limiting Drafts for Naval Surface Ships, lists the weight and KG impacts for each class of 
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naval combatant (2005). Most classes of combatants are in a restricted stability status (2) 
or (3), meaning that a rise of a ship’s KG cannot be accepted or must be avoided. Since 
internal fuel storage tanks aboard vessels are located below the KG, the KG is anticipated 
to elevate if less dense, lighter fuel is stored. 
Likewise, an internal NAVSEA letter from the Technical Warrant Holder, Weight 
Control and Stability details analysis on the changes in buoyancy and KG for naval surface 
vessels caused by substituting JP-5 for F-76 (Cimino, 2007). It notes ship classes AS-39, 
LHA-1, and LHD-1 as most negatively affected pursuant to NAVSEAINST 9096.3E 
guidelines for stability. The letter also states that if SFC implementation is to be seriously 
considered, further analysis should be conducted to include live combatant trials and 
possible revisions to stability standards based on observed performance characteristics. 
This is a significant issue for the SFC, and needs additional attention and consideration by 
authoritative experts. One possible mitigation strategy is to alter engineering manuals and 
procedures to laden ships with more ballast water in ships propulsion fuel tanks and ballast 
tanks to counter balance the decreased weight of JP-5. The written procedures for 
mechanical onboard pumping and ballasting processes for large deck amphibious aviation 
platforms will need detailed examination in future research to determine if counter 
ballasting can overcome KG elevation. 
4. Copper Nickel Contamination 
Copper Nickel (CuNi) is a frequently used alloy in piping unions and joints aboard 
maritime vessels. However, hydrocarbons’ prolonged exposure to CuNi causes deleterious 
effects to thermal stability and potential failure of the Jet Fuel Thermal Oxidation Test 
(JFTOT) per ASTM 3241 test methods (Putnam, 2018). 
As noted by Putnam in a NAVSEA Small Business Innovation Research white 
paper (2018), Joint Strike Fighter Command identified the adverse impact of copper in JP-
5 fuel that “creates maintenance and repair issues, such as coking, for aircraft engines as 
well as impairs performance capability.” (p. 1) Putnam goes on to note that CuNi 
contamination and JFTOT failure is more frequently observed in JP-5 stored aboard CVNs 
than aboard T-AOs and T-AKEs. This is primarily due to increased individual stock 
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turnover and thus decreased exposure time aboard refueling ships as compared to 
combatants (Putnam, 2018). 
We note that per MIL-STD-3004D, all fuel must pass A-series testing, to include 
JFTOT for jet fuels, prior to acceptance into DFSPs (DoD, 2016b). As fuel is passed further 
along the supply chain, less stringent C-series tests, which do not include JFTOT, are 
performed prior to acceptance from a shore DFSP into a CLF vessel, or from a CLF vessel 
into a combatant. JFTOT failure then becomes problematic once fuel is downloaded from 
a combatant back into a DFSP. MIL-STD-3004D also states that NAVAIR specifically calls 
for JFTOT testing in such instances. 
Currently, prior to any ship entering dry-docking shipyard restricted availabilities 
(DSRA), remaining stored fuel is downloaded for future use in the most economical 
manner (DoD, 2016b). Often, JP-5 is downgraded and blended into F-76 stocks, which 
does not require JFTOT in A-series testing. Since fuel stored aboard CLF hulls are less 
likely to suffer CuNi contamination, the SFC is unlikely to prevent downloads back into 
DLA Energy storage. However, upon SFC implementation, downloads would only be able 
to be blended into JP-5 stocks. 
Currently, no onboard mitigation systems exist, therefore, developing a CuNi 
contamination prevention, and/or filtration technology JP-5 is important in mitigating the 
deleterious effects of CuNi. 
F. SUMMARY 
Our review of the literature indicates that previous studies were focused on 
technical feasibility, costs, operational impacts, and force structure implications of 
switching to the SFC. However, there are gaps in evaluating F-76 and JP-5 historical 
demand to glean operational benefits of adopting the SFC, and gaps in modeling to 
determine force structure requirements using contemporary assumptions. Therefore, this 
study analyzes F-76 and JP-5 contemporary demand history, accounting for demand 
variability, to exploit inventory pooling effects, and perform modeling using contemporary 
threat, environment, and concept of operations (CONOPS) assumptions to determine force 
structure requirements based on adopting the SFC. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. HISTORICAL DATA 
Our data was aggregated by Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) 
inventory and accounting software, and provided by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), 
with the permission of NAVSUP (R. Fye, email to authors, October 10, 2019). The dataset 
spanned from April 1, 2014, to September 30, 2019, and included 27,250 data entries for 
fuel and non-fuel services and products provided by ashore and afloat units. All fuel 
transactions were originally in gallons but were converted to bbls for consistency 
throughout our analysis. 
The data was filtered to remove all non-fuel transactions, and then segregated by 
ashore or afloat sources to isolate and analyze only those fuel transactions provided by CLF 
assets. The unused fuel data constitutes combatant-to-combatant transactions, such as JP-
5 transferred from a CVN to a DDG, as well as transactions from ashore DFSPs or partner 
nation ashore or afloat assets to U.S. combatants. Then the data was partitioned by product 
type by each CLF ship. This allowed us to monitor combatant demand during each 
UNREP, the transaction date, and in which Numbered Fleet the UNREP occurred. 
When partitioning the data into Numbered Fleets, if all UNREPs between onloads 
occurred within the same fleet, that demand data was assigned to that Numbered Fleet. If 
between CLF onload events, UNREPs occurred in two or more fleets, then that demand 
data was assigned as a change of operational control (CHOP) event. Of note, so few fuel-
related UNREPs occurred in 4TH Fleet, that all transactions were added to either 2ND FLT 
or CHOP transactions, depending on circumstances. 
In our analysis, a cycle for each product is defined as the period between CLF 
onloading events for that product type. The demand quantities for each product type, within 
each cycle, were then summed and further agglomerated into sub-datasets by CLF type and 
again by Numbered Fleet. Then, means and standard deviations of demand were produced 
for each product type within each of the two sub-dataset classifications. 
26 
Given that the central premise of this thesis is to analyze the operational impact of 
SFC implementation, all F-76 transactions were recalculated as η76 values. This enabled 
us to calculate the prospective quantities of JP-5 that would have been required for ships’ 
propulsion across the dataset time span. Further explanation is provided below as to how 
our η76 value was calculated and why it is necessary when discussing the SFC. 
B. APPLIED ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
1. CLF Type Calculated Ao 
The operational availability (Ao) of the CLF, in concert with the inventory pooling 
method, will be used in Results to estimate potential cost avoidance to the Navy. Per the 
authors’ email correspondence with Commander, MSC headquarters staff (G. S. Palabrica, 
March 16, 2020), MSC defines Ao as “days available for tasking,” which equates to the 
total number of days each CLF vessel is certified and operationally available during a year. 
In order to generate a composite Ao for T-AKEs and T-AOs respectively, spanning the 
dataset timeframe, we summed the annual average Ao for each type for years FY15 through 
FY19, which equaled 1,452.6 days for T-AKEs and 1,289.0 for T-AOs. Then, we divided 
these figures by the total number of days within FY15 through FY19, or 1,826 days. Thus, 
the Ao for the 12 hull T-AKE fleet was 79.6 percent and 70.6 percent for the 15 hull T-AO 
fleet. Of note, the T-AKEs USNS Sacagawea and USNS Lewis and Clark are considered 
prepositioned forces, and as such, no demand data was collected for them. Additionally, 
we declined to compute this figure for the two presently in-service T-AOEs, as the Navy 
has no plans for future shipbuilding of this type. 
2. Calculating JP-5 Efficiency Loss 
To analyze the impacts of the SFC on ship propulsion performance, a standard 
power output profile was computed to compare JP-5 and F-76. Since the SFC necessitates 
JP-5 as the single fuel, F-76 demand quantities across our dataset were multiplied by an 
efficiency value, η, to accurately measure the additional quantity of JP-5 that would have 
been consumed for ship propulsion in the SFC scenario. Our analysis utilized the 2013 
NF&L CFT requirement of 43 MJ/kg for F-76, which is likely more stringent than 
necessary (Weisser & Turgeon, 2013). 
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For the purpose of calculation in comparing the energy density differences between 
JP-5 and F-76, we used the median API gravity profiles for JP-5 as 0.817 kg/L and as 0.838 
kg/L for F-76. Then, each API gravity was multiplied by the minimum heating values by 
mass, 42.6 MJ/kg for JP-5 and 43 MJ/kg for F-76. Thus, the heating value by volume for 
JP-5 is 34.8 MJ/L at 15°C (59°F) and 36.0 MJ/L at 15°C (59°F) for F-76. JP-5 therefore 
contains only 96.5 percent of the potential energy of F-76. Stated differently, our computed 
η value would be equal to 36.0 divided by 34.8, or roughly 1.036. Then, η is multiplied by 
F-76 demand quantities within the dataset to produce calculated quantities of JP-5 that 
would be necessary under the SFC; we term these quantities η76. 
Likewise, previous boiler performance tests were conducted by NSWCCD 
(Rebold, 2004), and a report by the NF&L CFT (2018) lists the consolidated results of 
numerous diesel engine performance tests. These tests showed power output decreases that 
ranged from one to four percent, depending on the platform type and load requirements 
placed on the engine or boiler. A BFLRF report detailed comparative energy density test 
results between the two products and showed a 2.6 percent volumetric energy density 
deficit in JP-5 as compared to F-76 (Tosh et al., 1992). 
While the BFLRF findings were derived from laboratory test results and our η76 
value is computed, we shall use the computed value for several reasons. First, the BFLRF 
tests were conducted nearly thirty years ago. Changes in the refining industry as well as 
regional differences between kerosene feed stocks and individual refineries can yield 
distinct results between samples. Secondly, our computed η76 value is still within the one 
to four percent range confirmed by multiple separate agencies’ more recent test results. 
Third, our computed value is more conservative and less generous to our analysis than 
using lower efficiency loss values. 
Finally, while a three percent efficiency loss may appear significant, as will be 
shown in Results, upon applying our chosen analysis technique, the net “savings” to naval 
operational readiness will actually overcome the additional JP-5 required for ship 
propulsion. 
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3. Inventory Pooling Method 
Inventory pooling, sometimes referred to as risk pooling, is a supply chain 
management technique widely used to mitigate demand uncertainty and lower overall 
inventory levels by consolidating stock points or reducing the variety of offered products. 
It is most beneficial where demand is varied and not positively correlated (Eppen, 1979). 
Supply managers retain certain levels of safety stock (SS) above those levels that are 
required to meet mean (µ) demand between resupply deliveries. Therefore, SS is only 
utilized when demand is greater than average, before stocks are replenished again. 
Conversely, if demand falls below average, then SS goes unutilized and unnecessary 
holding costs are incurred during that cycle. The ability to satisfy customer demand is 
known as the desired service level, and is more difficult to maintain, as variability in 
demand between cycles increases as some cycles may unexpectedly experience unusually 
high customer demand before resupply. The size of SS levels is calculated as a product of 
the desired service level and the standard deviation (σ) of demand variability during a 
cycle. Thus, if supply managers desire to maintain current service levels, but also reduce 
SS levels, then the variability in demand must decrease. Conversely, if SS levels remain 
unchanged, but supply managers desire to increase service levels, then again, the variability 
in demand must decrease. 
If the demand for two products, in this case F-76 and JP-5, were pooled into demand 
for a single product under the SFC, the potential for lower demand for one product within 
a given time period may then offset the potentially higher demand for the second product. 
Thus, the pooled mean demand under the SFC is calculated as the sum of the of the 
averages of the two formerly distinct products and expressed as 
76 5SFC F JPµ µ µ− −= + . 
Furthermore, the pooled risk in consolidating demand under the SFC is calculated 
by deriving the square root of the summed demand variances, or squared standard 
deviations, assuming demand is uncorrelated, during a cycle and is expressed as 
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2 2
76 5SFC F JPσ σ σ− −= + . 
Thus, SS and average inventory levels can be reduced, while maintaining service 
levels to meet the same consolidated mean demand, if the standard deviation of demand is 
reduced during a cycle (Eppen, 1979). 
Inventory savings can then be directly measured by calculating the difference 
between the combined standard deviation for the single product and the sum of standard 
deviations across the distinct products and expressed as 
( )-76 -5Inventory savings = F JP SFCσ σ σ+ −
. 
A final way to measure performance improvements within a supply system is to 
look at the coefficient of variation (Cv). Cv is the ratio of the standard deviation relative to 
mean demand and expressed as 
Cv = σ
µ . 
To measure performance improvement after inventory pooling, the combined Cv is 
compared to the individual Cv of separate markets. Cv analysis will be used to compare 
SFC implementation effects amongst Numbered Fleets and detailed in Results. 
4. Calculated Mean and Standard Deviation of Demand 
Before the inventory pooling technique can be applied to fuel demand, we first 
calculated the mean and standard deviation of demand for each product type, by each CLF 
type from our dataset. All F-76 demand quantities were multiplied by our computed SFC 
efficiency loss, η, before any other computations. Table 1 contains our results. 
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Table 1. Mean and standard deviation of demand by product and CLF type 
  T-AKE (bbls) T-AO (bbls) T-AOE (bbls) 
η76 𝞵𝞵 15,198 42,734 40,580 
𝞂𝞂 10,951 30,224 43,827 
JP-5 𝞵𝞵 4,857 30,919 25,863 
𝛔𝛔 7,861 47,113 22,585 
 
5. SFC Inventory Pooling Adaptation 
Our analysis differs from traditional inventory pooling analysis by redefining cycle 
periodicities and reinterpreting inventory savings in this context. As will be shown, both 
deviations from traditional practices are driven by and necessary to accommodate the 
unique nature and requirements of maritime refueling operations. 
First, unlike resupply to commercial facilities, which are often triggered by timed 
deliveries, CLF vessels onload at irregular intervals, and as often as practicable in 
compliance with OPORD 201 guidance. Additionally, CLF service to combatants is 
flexible. For example, within a month, a CLF acting as the station ship for a CSG may be 
detached from regular duties to travel vast distances, in support of an independent-deployer 
combatant, to then CHOP and service a new AOR. Likewise, demand on CLF fuel stores 
is driven by the same OPORD guidance. For example, a combatant and CLF may UNREP 
again after only two or three days, if the combatant received unexpected orders to travel to 
an AOR without CLF coverage, and its next UNREP is unknown. For these reasons, our 
analysis treats a cycle as the period between onloads for each product type, instead of a 
fixed time period.  
Secondly, whereas a goal for commercial facilities is to reduce inventory while 
maintaining service level, OPORD 201 guidance mandates that CLF assets shall refill to 
their maximum allowable storage capacity as often as practicable. Thus, the reduction in 
standard deviation of demand during cycles may then be viewed as supplemental fuel 
brought into the battle space, and an increase in service level. Stated differently, under the 
SFC, the CLF could meet all combatant demand and transport less fuel; however, since 
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they will remain as full as possible, at any given time, this excess fuel may be viewed as 
increased potential responsiveness, or as additional maritime refueling capacity at sea. 
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To define the maritime operational environment, the unclassified scenario 
developed for this thesis uses a fictitious conflict with the People’s Republic of China. This 
scenario was determined relevant in light of what the 2017 NSS identified as China’s efforts 
to “build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea,” which “endanger the free flow 
of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability” (White 
House, 2017, p. 46). This scenario demonstrates increased CLF utilization by switching to 
the SFC in a contested environment, in line with the Secretary of Defense’s goal of 
“Building a More Lethal Force” (DoD, 2018, p. 5). The order of battle modeled in this 
scenario was not based on actual military planning documents. Instead, we chose forces 
which represent typical combatant ship combinations, and known commodity usage rates, 
to determine the logistics necessary to maintain continuous combat operations. 
A. CONTESTED ENVIRONMENT 
Currently, China uses anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to deter and 
compete in the Pacific Ocean; among the various weapon systems used to support China’s 
A2/AD strategy, this scenario is primarily concerned with the DF-26 Intermediate-Range 
Ballistic Missile and DF-21D Medium-Range Ballistic Missile threats. The DF-26 is a 
road-mobile, nuclear and conventional capable missile with a range of approximately 4,000 
km (OSD, 2019). This is an important modeling assumption as the threat range of this 
missile envelopes DFSPs within the AOR, potentially restricting current U.S. fuel supply 
access. The DF-21D is an anti-ship ballistic missile, touted as a carrier killer, with a range 
of approximately 1,500 km (Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 2019). Knowing 
that the U.S. has historically used CSGs as the primary instrument to establish maritime 
and air superiority, China developed this missile to shape the operating environment in 
their favor by attempting to deny U.S. naval ships access within the first island chain. This 
is an important modeling assumption as it shapes the environment that the CLF can operate 
in. 
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B. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
The U.S. is drawn into conflict with China as a result of Chinese aggression against 
the U.S. and its regional allies. U.S. forces have sortied to their designated areas of 
operations and have resupplied all fuel, ordnance, and stores to maximum inventory levels. 
Sustained combat operations begin in the morning and provide the basis of our steady-state 
analysis. 
In response to U.S. and its allies’ rhetoric and force positioning, China deploys its 
DF-21D and DF-26 missile systems, and U.S. intelligence experiences difficulty tracking 
mobile missile movements. However, the intelligence community has provided the 
following DF-21D and DF-26 threat assessments, Figure 6 and Figure 7, with high 
confidence. 
 
Figure 6. DF-21D threat based on intelligence sources 
It can be determined from Figure 6 that Chinese missile placement effectively 
denies U.S. naval forces and CLF from entering the first island chain, as well as access to 
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DFSPs located in the Philippines and Japan. These are critical factors when considering 
the flow of fuel into theater.  
 
Figure 7. DF-26 threat based on intelligence 
It can also be determined from Figure 7 that Chinese missile placement enables 
targeting DFSPs located in Guam and Singapore (bottom left of figure). Accordingly, this 
leaves fuel available at DFSPs at Wake Island, the Marshall Islands, and Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii. 
C. SCENARIO CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The CONOPS chosen to provide the fuel logistics necessary for sustained combat 
operations is based on what the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments termed 
“Go Big” (Walton et al., 2019, p. 41). Under this concept, CONSOL tankers would shuttle 
cargo fuel from DFSPs to replenish station ships—T-AOs, T-AOEs, or T-AKEs—
underway. This CONOPS was chosen due to three distinct advantages: more cargo fuel 
storage, ease to modify CONSOL tankers to gain UNREP capability, and greater 
operational range when compared to current MSC CLF shuttle ships. 
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First, tankers can store significantly more cargo fuel than CLF oilers. For example, 
MSC’s tanker MT Empire State can store nearly double the cargo fuel USNS Henry J. 
Kaiser (T-AO 187) class fleet oiler. This enables more fuel to be stored at sea; thereby 
decreasing the number of times a fleet oiler has to return to port. This decreases 
opportunities for the enemy to locate and target the CLF. Additionally, the use of tankers 
brings the source of fuel closer to the combatants, enabling quicker access to cargo fuel. 
Second, tankers can be easily modified to connect to the CLF underway, on either 
two or four stations, in order to support Navy CLF operations (Walton et al., 2019). This 
enables tankers to CONSOL with MSC fuel cargo ships underway, as proven through 
CONSOL operations involving the USNS Rainier and the MT Empire State during 
RIMPAC 2016 (Burford, 2016).  
Third, and most important to this scenario, the tankers’ operational range is in 
excess of 6,000 nmi, when compared to 3,000 nmi for T-AOs and T-AOEs. While the 
Marshall Islands and Wake Island are within the operational range of all three ship types, 
these DFSPs are relatively small with the largest quantity of either product, totaling 
104,288 bbls. For this reason, all fuel will be transported from the DFSP located at Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii in this scenario. 
Finally, using tankers leverages MSC’s CLF as station ships with their associate 
combatants, as originally intended. In the scenario, CLF ships will enter and exit the 
contested environment, as necessary, in order to CONSOL with tankers positioned at a 
designated location outside of the contested environment. This CONOPS mitigates the 
tankers’ risk of exposure to the enemy while providing timely and responsive delivery of 
cargo fuel to the combatants. 
Two scenarios were modeled to contrast the existing system using two fuels to only 
using JP-5 – the SFC. Both scenarios use the same combatant composition outlined in 
Table 2. Scenario 1 represents the status quo of using two fuels, F-76 and JP-5, to satisfy 
combatant fuel demands. Furthermore, CLF and CONSOL tanker fuel cargo holds were 
configured to best support operational demand by task force. For example, when operations 
in task force 17.1 demanded 66 percent JP-5 and 34 percent F-76, cargo fuel holds in the 
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CLF and CONSOL tankers were configured to support using a 70/30 JP-5 to F-76 split. 
Scenario 2 uses only JP-5 to satisfy both F-76 and JP-5 aviation and ship propulsion fuel 
requirements. What the scenarios demonstrate are fewer required CLF and charter tankers 
to support the same operations under the SFC and an increase in task force endurance. 
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* T-AO 187 class oiler is the single hull variant  
** Two T-AO/T-AKE pair for Scenario 1 and one T-AO/T-AKE pair for Scenario 2 
 
Additionally, both scenarios use tanker CONSOL points for each task force located 
3,500 nmi from Hawaii; as illustrated in Figure 8. It can be noted that a range of tanker 
CONSOL points located closer to mainland China, such as the South China Sea, could be 
considered based on the tanker’s 6,000 nmi operational radius. Our tanker CONSOL point 
was chosen because at this location, the T-AO has the operational radius, based on the 
CONOPS chosen, to operate inside the first island chain supporting combat operations as 
necessary. Tanker CONSOL points located at varying distances from Hawaii would most 
certainly be chosen in a real-world operation. However, for the sake of demonstrating the 
benefits of the SFC, a single tanker CONSOL point distance of 3,500 nmi was chosen. 
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Figure 8. Tanker CONSOL point 
D. LOGISTICS PLANNING FACTORS 
The logistics planning factors used in both scenarios were referenced from NWP: 
Sustainment at Sea (DoN, 2007). Both scenarios’ daily assault rate fuel consumptions and 
ship capacities were referenced to determine aggregate task group consumption and 
capacity. Table 3 summarizes the two fuel types referenced by ship class. Additionally, 
ship speeds and operational radii for T-AOs and tankers were referenced from this 
publication, summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Combatant F-76 and JP-5 capacities and daily assault rate 
consumption values by ship type 
  JP5 (bbls) F-76 (bbls) 
Class Capacity Daily usage Capacity Daily usage 
CVN 74,642 5,000 0 0 
CG 475 39 15,032 757 
DDG 475 34 10,518 646 
LHD 14,452 759 43,091 1,071 
LPD 6,700 324 23,750 528 
LSD 1,144 81 19,150 346 
 
Table 4. T-AO and Tanker general capabilities 
Ship Speed (kn) Max Speed (kn) Op Radius (nmi) Cargo Fuel (bbls) 
T-AO 17 20 3,000 180,000* 
T-AKE 20 24 14,000 23,450* 
T-AOT 15 20 6,000 300,000* 
* Can be configured for 50/50, 30/70, or 70/30 F-76 and JP-5 split 
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VI. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
A. RATIONALE FOR DETERMINISTIC MODELING 
We chose a steady-state deterministic model to find the number of T-AOs and 
tankers required to support combat forces in the scenario, where steady-state is defined as 
the station ship supplying, on-average, what the task force consumed, on-average. 
Stochastic simulation was also considered, but it was determined that introducing 
randomness would provide little value until a complete deterministic solution was found. 
Ultimately, we sought a tractable model that would provide rapid, meaningful 
interpretation.  
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
Within the above scenarios, we assumed the following: 
1. Daily time resolution is adequate to compute the number of T-AOs and 
tankers required to support our scenario. Daily time resolution was chosen 
because it aligns with most fleet logistics planning factors used to prepare 
time-phase force deployment planning methods.  
2. Daily commodity demand was aggregated for whole task groups. Under 
this assumption, in the short-run, there is some fidelity lost in tracking T-
AO daily commodity levels. However, in the long-run, it does not affect 
determining on what day the T-AO reached critical commodity levels. It 
was assumed that, even under a DMO concept, combatants would 
schedule an UNREP when they reach critical fuel levels, and the T-AO 
would be able to provide uniform replenishment to full inventory while 
cargo fuel exists.  
3. Fuel inventory was the primary constraint driving T-AO and tanker fuel 
replenishment events. Therefore, when calculating the number of tankers 
to support operations, only F-76 and JP-5 fuel critical inventory levels in 
DOS were considered. For example, if combatant ordnance and/or stores 
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demand depleted a T-AKE’s DOS for that commodity before fuel 
inventory critical levels were reached, our analysis would only generate a 
CONSOL for the latter. Consideration of ordinance and stores’ inventory 
levels would likely need to be included in future analysis to determine a 
CONOP to support their logistical demands. 
4. Each task group was assigned one or more T-AO/T-AKE pairs based on 
fuel demand and would act as a station ship or shuttle ship when 
necessary. The T-AO/T-AKE pair was considered to be a shuttle ship 
when in transit to the tanker CONSOL point. 
5. Time to reload a tanker in-port would take approximately 2.5 days. While 
refueling a tanker would likely take less time than this approximation, we 
gave allowances for minimal in-port scheduled and unscheduled ship 
maintenance and stores loading/unloading.  
6. Time for T-AO/T-AKE pair to CONSOL with tanker was one day. 
7. Combatant fuel critical levels were set at 50 percent total capacity. Each 
task group would operate on a maximum six-day replenishment cycle. As 
a result, the distance from the center of each task group’s operations area 
to CLF/tanker CONSOL point would be no greater than 2.5 days’ travel in 
one direction. 
8. All current CLF F-76 cargo fuel space would be converted for JP-5 cargo 
fuel storage under the SFC concept. 
9. Minimum DOS required per task group was set at 12. Doing so minimized 
the number of tanker CONSOLs in order to reduce the opportunity for 
enemy detection. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
The model is limited by the following factors: 
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1. The model did not include stochastic variation. It would be useful to know 
combatant fuel usage variability as a function of operations, dispersion, 
and tactical maneuvering and its effects on T-AO and CONSOL tanker 
requirements. This would enable decision makers to quantify combatant 
logistics risk.  
2. NWP Sustainment at Sea planning factors for fuel usage rates are 12 years 
old and reflect counterinsurgency-based operations. If contemporary 
demand values were known that better reflected MCOs, the model could 
better determine T-AO and CONSOL tanker requirements. 
3. Transient stages were not captured. T-AO and CONSOL tanker 
requirements would certainly be different as function of operational phase. 
Pre-assault F-76 usage rates would almost double the F-76 usage rates 
during the assault phase for CG and DDG combatants and would demand 
increasing T-AO and CONSOL tanker requirements as a function of the 
distance from Hawaii. 
4. CLF ship attrition was not considered. Accounting for attrition, based on 
historical data or war simulation, and rounding up to whole ships would 
increase the number of T-AOs and possibly CONSOL tankers required to 
support operations.  
D. MODEL 
The steady-state model we created was largely based on a similar model produced 
by CNA to determine the number of T-AKE class ships required in several AORs. At the 
time, T-AKEs were known as the planned T-ADC(X) class auxiliary dry cargo carrier and 
were required to support wartime requirements, based on the 1997 versions of the Non-
Nuclear Ordnance Requirements, the Naval Planning Scenarios, and the Defense Planning 
Guidance. The CNA defines steady-state as “one in which the CLF delivers, on average, 
what the combatants consume, on average.” (John, 1998, p. 6). The CNA modeled the 
combatant’s initial inventory of stores, ordnance, and fuel as “sumps.” As John writes, 
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“Demand is satisfied by the sumps, and the CLF resupply side replenishes the sumps.” 
(John, 1998, p. 6). Variability in sump daily demand was not considered because the model 
analyzed was said to be in steady-state—supply for stores, ordnance, and fuel equals 
demand for the same. A visual representation of the model is included in Figure 9.  
Key differences in our model were the choice in shuttle ship – using CONSOL 
tankers to resupply oilers, using T-AOs to act in both a shuttle ship and station ship 
capacity, and using one fuel to satisfy combatant demand. Critical inputs to the model were 
the considerations of supply and demand.  
 
 
Figure 9. Basic steady-state model overview 
1. Supply 
To meet the demands of the task force, CONSOL tankers had to replenish their 
cargo fuel at the Pearl Harbor, Hawaii DFSP, transit from the DFSP to a CONSOL point, 
perform underway CONSOL operations, and then transit back to the DFSP for resupply. 
The time to complete this process was considered the process cycle-time. The primary 
variable driving cycle-time was the transit distance between the DFSP and CONSOL point. 
Supply 
- CLF cargo fuel capacity 
- CLF cargo fuel transfer 
capability 
- CLF speed 
- Forces distances from DFSP 
Demand 
- Number of Forces 
- Force Composition 
- Position of Forces 




- Number of CLF required 
to support operations 
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Transit time was computed using the elementary relationship between speed, time, and 
distance. As previously stated, the constant for tanker loading time was assumed to be 2.5 
days and the constant for CONSOL time was assumed to be one day.  
In one cycle, the shuttle ship delivers its fuel cargo in the total cycle time computed. 
This amount of bbls per day represents the shuttle ship’s capacity to deliver either quantity 
of cargo fuel – F-76 or JP-5. It should be noted the shuttle ship’s cargo fuel capacity is 
limited by the station ship’s cargo fuel capacity for any given fuel type, in order to avoid a 
virtual surplus in station ship cargo fuel. 
2. Demand 
Fuel demand was calculated for the forces listed in Table 2. Scenario 1 involves 
two fuels – F-76 and JP-5. In this scenario, the CONSOL requirement was driven by the 
fuel with the least DOS available. In Scenario 2, which used solely JP-5 under the SFC, 
the CONSOL requirement was driven by JP-5 cargo fuel DOS. In Scenario 1, the more 
closely that F-76/JP-5 cargo fuel split aligned with fuel demand, relative to storage 
capacity, then the more closely the outcomes of Scenarios 1 and 2 would resemble each 
other. 
3. Steady-state Model Formula 
The model used to calculate the number of T-AOs and tankers required to support 
the task force is expressed as 
12 days  Task group usage (bbls/day)Number of TAOs = 
TAO cargo fuel capacity (bbls/tanker)
×
, and as 
Number of CONSOL tankers =
Task force demanded (bbls/day)
Tanker cargo fuel delivered (bbls/day) Cycle-time(days/tanker)× . 
The output of the model was a fractional number of T-AOs and CONSOL tankers 
required to supply the task force fuel demand. For our results, outputs were rounded up to 
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the nearest whole number of station and shuttle ships. For example, if the output was 1.1 
ships, we rounded up to 2 ships. 
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VII. RESULTS 
A. HISTORICAL DEMAND ANALYSIS 
1. Capacity Augmentation by CLF Type 
As described under Methodology, the reduction in variability produced by the SFC 
cannot be directly translated into inventory savings for the CLF. Instead, the impact of SFC 
implementation is viewed in terms of increased service level or additional CLF refueling 
capacity. Since the average storage capacities for each CLF type, as shown in Table 5, are 
functions of each fleets’ composition, these figures will only change when ships are 
commissioned or decommissioned. Thus, these figures change slowly and infrequently and 
can be used to calculate potential refueling capacity expansion under the SFC. 
When the means and standard deviations of demand for each product type are 
combined per the inventory pooling technique, as described in Methodology, our research 
shows that the CLF’s capacity to refuel combatants would improve as detailed in Table 5. 
Additionally, this capacity expansion can be expressed as a percent increase when divided 
by the average total combined product storage capacity, by CLF type.  
Table 5. Storage capacity expansion via SFC by CLF type 
  T-AKE T-AO T-AOE 
Average Total Capacity (bbls) 26,273 173,353 166,585 
SFC Capacity Expansion (bbls) 5,332 21,363 17,108 
Capacity Expansion (%) 20.29% 12.32% 10.27% 
 
This means that under the status quo, a dual fuel Navy, in order to acquire the same 
augmented service level and afloat refueling capacity at any given time that the SFC 
provides, every currently operationally available T-AKE, for example, would need 
retrofitted with a 5,332 bbl auxiliary cargo fuel tank. Stated differently, without making 
alterations to any existing hulls, under the SFC every T-AKE available for tasking could 
carry 20.29 percent more cargo fuel than at present. Of note, these figures account for the 
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additional quantities of JP-5 required for ship propulsion, due to its lower energy density 
value, under the SFC. 
2. Potential for Cost Avoidance 
To analyze the inventory pooling method’s effect on CLF size and any inherent 
monetary savings, Ao for each CLF type fleet was considered. Therefore, by multiplying 
the number of hulls in each ship type by its respective Ao as computed in Methodology, 
and then again by the respective CLF type afloat capacity expansion percentage, our 
analysis indicates that the SFC yields the equivalent additional storage capacity of 1.94 T-
AKE hulls and 1.31 T-AO hulls at sea, at any given time. 
Lastly, we can estimate potential cost avoidance derived by ship type. According 
to a 2019 Congressional Research Service report, the next T-AO hull, slated for 
commission in FY20, will cost $528.1 million (O'Rourke, 2019). Per the authors’ email 
correspondence with NASSCO program managers, the two most recent T-AKE hulls, 
commissioned in FY11, averaged $412.5 million (T. Wetherald, March 4, 2020). Then, 
using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index inflation calculator, 
this would be worth $476.5 million in FY20 (BLS, n.d.). Thus, when the dollar figures 
above are multiplied by the representative number of additional hulls that our computed 
storage capacity expansion yields, SFC implementation would realize immediate afloat 
storage capacity benefits, while also avoiding costs equal to more than $1.61 billion. 
3. Cv Improvement by Numbered Fleet 
Compared to total CLF fleet storage capacity, afloat storage capacity within 
Numbered Fleets is dynamic, since CLF assets CHOP in and out constantly, but irregularly. 
Thus, Cv improvement, instead of capacity expansion, was used to compare the Numbered 
Fleets. Figure 10 shows the ranked differences between the Cv of each product type by 
Fleet and the Cv under the SFC. 
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Figure 10. Coefficient of variation (Cv) improvement by Fleet 
Since the SFC eliminates one type of fuel, but not the associated activity that 
generates demand—ship propulsion or aviation—the benefit of decreased variability is 
only as good as the Cv reduction for either product which experiences the least reduction. 
Therefore, the Fleets were ranked from left to right in terms of the most significant Cv 
reduction on the product least benefitted by the SFC. 
As shown, every Fleet would have experienced a reduction in demand variability 
for both product types, except for 5TH. The CLF in 5TH Fleet would experience a drastic 
increase in its ability to meet aviation fuel demand, but only at the expense of its ability to 
meet surface propulsion fuel demand. We speculate that this is driven mainly by the 
relatively high operational tempo of naval aviation operations, and tight concentration of 
forces within a confined operating area, which requires less transient ship steaming relative 
to aviation operations. Meanwhile, the vast distances covered in 7TH and 3RD Fleets 























Figure 11. U.S. Navy numbered Fleet commanders’ AORs. Source: 
Wikimedia Commons (2009). 
This notion would express itself in the Cv equation for JP-5, as the numerator σ 
grows relative to the denominator µ. Since ships steam continually, but aviation operations 
are episodic, with high-intensity demand, the standard deviation of demand for F-76 will 
nearly always be lower than for that of JP-5. Furthermore, since we defined a cycle as the 
period between CLF fuel-onloads, and given the perpetually close proximity between any 
point within 5TH Fleet’s small AOR and a DFSP, CLF ship masters can be more confident 
in satisfying larger demand quantities before resupplying. Thus, due to the frequency of 
sporadic, high-intensity JP-5 demand, with nearly constant CVN presence in the AOR, 
5TH Fleet’s standard deviation is much larger than its mean, when compared to other 
Fleets. 
As shown above, the differences in the nature of operations conducted between 
fleets are as important to our analysis as the quantities of fuel demanded. To better 
understand how Cv improvement would benefit each Fleet, a value relative to global 
demand was constructed to better represent SFC’s impact within each fleet. Therefore, we 
created Table 6 to demonstrate the percentage of each product type proportional to total 
combined global demand. 
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Table 6. Product type demanded by Fleet as a percentage of total combined 
global demand 
Fleet F-76 (%) JP-5 (%) Total (%) 
7TH 16.9 5.6 22.5 
3RD 12.8 4.5 17.3 
2ND & 4TH 11.5 1.4 12.9 
IN/OUT CHOP 11.3 3.7 15.0 
6TH 5.4 0.9 6.3 
5TH 19.7 6.1 25.9 
Total 77.6 22.4 100.0 
 
The Cv reduction value for each product in each numbered fleet was then multiplied 
by its respective percentage of total global demand for both products. Figure 12 shows the 
fleets ranked again from left to right, but now by throughput-weighted Cv improvement, 
where the benefit (or detriment) from the SFC for both ship propulsion and aviation 
demand is added. 
 
Figure 12. Fleet Cv improvements weighted by demand 
The figures above provide a broad approach to understanding the impact of the SFC 























the dataset, then numbered fleet commanders should see improved refueling service 
capability and responsiveness like the figures above if the SFC was adopted. Decision 
makers may therefore choose to use this information to geographically prioritize and phase-
in implementation if the SFC were adopted. 
4. Reduced Port Visits 
An ancillary benefit of the SFC is the potential to reduce the number of expected 
port visits, and the related charges, for CLF cargo fuel-onloading each year. As shown in 
Table 7, we counted the number of fuel-onload port visits made by each ship type according 
to one of four categories: F-76 only, F-76 driven, JP-5 driven, and JP-5 only. Each 
categorization describes whether the ship loaded a single product or loaded more of one 
product than the other, relative to that product’s storage capacity of each product. 
Table 7. Port visits by product and CLF type 
  
T-AKE T-AO T-AOE 
Average Total Average Total Average Total 
F-76 only 26.9 403.0 44.9 494.0 18.3 55.0 
F-76 driven 15.7 236.0 5.1 56.0 11.7 35.0 
JP-5 driven 5.8 87.0 1.3 14.0 15.7 47.0 
JP-5 only 1.0 15.0 0.5 5.0 0.7 2.0 
 
In order to fairly account for the port visits, the USNS Charles Drew (T-AKE 10) 
was excluded from the dataset for this analysis only, as it was converted to solely carry JP-
5, prior to its 7TH/5TH Fleet deployment in 2018. Were it included, JP-5 only and JP-5 
driven port visit tallies, and T-AKE fleet averages would have been higher. As is evident 
by the data, F-76 demand is the primary driver for all three CLF type port visits. However, 
we estimate that if inventory pooling effects were in place, the number of port visits could 
have been reduced by at least 22 and at most 170 over the dataset’s 66-month time span. 
This averages from anywhere between 4 to 31 fewer MSC port visits annually, depending 
on whether JP-5 driven instances are included. 
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Thus, this calculation is an inexact science, since port visits are driven by ship 
masters’ behavior in compliance with AOR-specific OPORD 201 directives, and not by 
defined inventory levels or time-related policies. Regardless, since the SFC yields higher 
combined inventory postures than the status quo, it should be recognized that ship masters 
would be compelled to pull into port less frequently than current demands dictate. 
B. SCENARIO 
1. T-AO and CONSOL Tanker Requirements 
The results of the steady-state model estimated how many T-AOs and CONSOL 
tankers were required to support the two scenarios given by task group. By summing the 
number of T-AOs and CONSOL tankers over all the task groups we calculated the number 
of in-service ships required to support either scenario. Assuming a 71 percent Ao for the 
T-AOs, we calculated the number of additional CLF ships needed to maintain the in-service 
requirement due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance. It is likely that the Ao for T-
AOs would be larger during a wartime environment. Conversely, Ao was not considered 
for CONSOL tankers because the in-service requirement would be met by a time charter 
tanker for the duration and be capable of meeting the capacity requirements. Adding the 
number of in-service and in-maintenance ships yielded the total number of T-AOs and 
CONSOL tankers required to support either scenario, illustrated in Table 8. Using 
traditional CONOPs – Scenario 1, the total number of T-AOs required was nine with seven 
CONSOL tankers. Under the SFC – Scenario 2, the total number of T-AOs required was 
reduced to eight with six CONSOL tankers.  
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Table 8. CLF ships and CONSOL tankers required to support scenarios 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Task Force T-AO Tanker T-AO Tanker 
17.1 1 2 1 1 
17.2 2 2 2 2 
17.3 2 2 1 2 
17.4 1 1 1 1 
In service 6 7 5 6 
Maintenance* 3 0 3 0 
Total 9 7 8 6 
* Assumed 71 percent operational availability 
 
Comparing these values against the 15 T-AOs available in CLF inventory and the 
six tankers on long-term charter by MSC, we can identify any potential shortfalls the DoD 
may encounter during the scenarios. Therefore, there is a surplus of six and seven CLF 
ships for Scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. It also follows that scenario one results in a 
shortfall of one tanker, and scenario 2 would require the use of all six long-term charter 
tankers. This assumes that in order to support either scenario, MSC would pull tanker 
resources from other operational requirements worldwide. 
2. Task Force Endurance 
The metric chosen to measure endurance was DOS, wherein each task group’s DOS 
was computed by dividing its average CLF cargo fuel amount by combatant daily demand 
for each product. This resulted in a fractional number of DOS available before the CLF 
exhausted its cargo fuel requiring a tanker CONSOL event. Finally, task force endurance 
was demonstrated by comparing DOS for each scenario, as illustrated in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Task force endurance 
As can be determined from Figure 13, Scenario 2, using the SFC increases supply 
for every task group, and ultimately, the entire task force. This would provide greater 
operational flexibility for the Task Force Commander. The marginal DOS increase 
between the two scenarios is illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. Increase in DOS by adopting SFC 






















While a one to three-day increase in DOS may not appear significant, it can 
meaningfully affect an operation’s logistics supportability given the relationship between 
the number of CONSOL tankers required to support operations and logistics cycle-time. 
As cycle-time increases, the number of CONSOL tankers required to support operations 
increases. Put another way, for every full day increase in DOS, the fight can move 360 nmi 
closer to the enemy without increasing the number of CONSOL tankers required to support 
operations without degrading operations. Finally, the added time allows for more circuitous 
navigation or tactical evasion due to enemy threats without sacrificing combatant 
operations or increasing CLF force structure requirements. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis shows that the SFC provides measurable operational benefits to the 
responsiveness and flexibility of maritime refueling logistics, primarily through enhanced 
CLF capacity to meet customer demand. Additionally, through recent historical analysis, 
it is estimated that all three primary refueling CLF classes and every numbered fleet would 
experience afloat storage capacity expansion through inventory pooling effects due to SFC 
implementation. Furthermore, under the SFC “Go Big” CONOPS scenario, when 
compared to the dual fuel CONOPS the Navy currently operates under, fewer fleet oilers 
and tankers would be required to provide the same level of service and logistics refueling 
capability during high-intensity operations, and task force endurance would be increased.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Given our analysis and results, the following are a few related research areas that 
we feel need further attention and would enable DoD decision-makers to better deliberate 
the impacts of SFC implementation. 
1. Amphibious Operational Impact Study 
While our study focused on the SFC operational impact on CLF assets’ ability to 
provide refueling logistics support to combatants, our study did not address the impact on 
combatants themselves. As discussed in our Literature Review, most engineering and 
technical specification concerns have been evaluated, and would not prohibit SFC 
implementation. Our central premise is that the SFC provides operational benefits by 
simplifying maritime fuel logistics and enhancing average battle group inventory posture. 
For most combatant platforms, the operational benefits stop at the increased flexibility of 
the CLF to meet combatant demand. For example, CVNs use nuclear propulsion and 
therefore already only store JP-5 aboard, and while DDGs and CGs store both products, F-
76 is stored in seawater-compensating tanks for ship stabilization purposes (NAVAIR, 
2006). Thus, while it is mechanically possible to transfer fuel from an existing F-76 storage 
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tank to the JP-5 service tank, this is procedurally forbidden for the sake of aircraft safety 
precautions. 
Prior research also identified that amphibious platforms such as LHA/LHDs, and 
LPDs, unlike other surface combatants, may experience increased endurance benefits 
under the SFC (D. Saks, personal communicaiton, April 7, 2020). These platforms are 
designed with ballast tanks in lieu of seawater-compensating tanks (NAVAIR, 2006) and 
therefore may be able to transfer fuel from F-76 storage to JP-5 service tanks, without 
sullying JP-5 for aviation use. Furthermore, since these platforms have much higher 
aviation fuel demand, relative to ship propulsion fuel, than other surface combatants, their 
JP-5 storage capacities relative to F-76’s are far larger. Therefore, amphibious platforms 
have the potential to experience the most significant benefits of the SFC at the tactical level 
of warfare.  
To test this theory, we used our historical dataset and factored in previously 
unutilized fuel demand serviced by DFSPs and foreign sources under Acquisition and 
Cross Service Agreements. Next, the means and standard deviations of LHA/LHD and 
LPD demand for each fuel type were calculated. After applying the inventory pooling 
method, our cursory analysis showed a 6.17 percent storage capacity expansion for 
LHA/LHDs and 3.15 percent for LPDs. While these figures appear modest, two points 
should be noted: first, these figures already account for η loss, and second, these figures 
include peace-time steaming and inter-theater transit fuel demand, which constitutes the 
bulk of F-76 usage. Therefore, the SFC may provide even greater benefits during MCOs 
with high aviation operational tempo. 
Further research is also needed to ensure that LHA/LHDs and LPDs have not been 
converted to include seawater-compensating fuel storage systems, per SHIPALT 941. If 
this is true, utilizing the inventory pooling method and the η76 value, analysis would be 
required on fuel consumption by type, compared to onboard storage capacity, as captured 
in daily engineering logs during real-world kinetic operations and exercises. From this, 
additional DOS for aviation requirements and TOS during air assault phases of battle could 
be computed. 
59 
2. Changes to DoD Prepositioning Requirements 
As we observed, the inventory pooling method is more easily applied to ashore 
DFSP demand in a traditional fashion than to afloat storage units; however, further research 
is needed to calculate potential inventory and cost reductions globally. Unlike traditional 
commercial inventory safety stock policies, stockage levels at DFSPs include 
Prepositioned War Reserve Stock (PWRS) when feasible. PWRS levels are driven by the 
Prepositioned War Reserve Requirement (PWRR), and “sized to satisfy the most 
demanding [operational plan (OPLAN) fuel] requirements at each DFSP” within a theater 
of operations (DoD, 2009, p. 6). This means that PWRS is not supposed to satisfy the 
requirements for every OPLAN, and instead is only for the largest or most restrictive 
requirement amongst OPLANs for that theater, and is intended for use only upon OPLAN 
execution. 
Thus, if the largest Army, USAF, and USMC aviation PWRR could be met via JP-
5, then the potential exists at numerous DFSPs where the SFC would produce a far greater 
JP-5 PWRS and thus satisfy jet fuel variant PWRRs. However, a future research project 
would need to verify that there are no procedural impediments for JP-5 use in ground V/E 
and aircraft that traditionally consume jet fuel variants during contingency situations. If 
this were so, then we recommend that these impediments were analyzed and challenged, 
such as in this thesis’ Literature Review: Counter Feasibility Arguments. 
Additionally, The Single Naval Fuel at Sea Feasibility Study – Phase Two – Task 
Five, Supply System Impact report (2005), identified a reduction in economic reorder 
quantity (ERQ) as the only inventory reduction benefit from the SFC, assumed that jet fuel 
variant PWRS levels could not be amended. The report went on to state that the potential 
reduction in ERQ quantities, and the associated holding cost savings, would not be large 
enough to warrant SFC implementation. 
Opportunities also exist to address the potential for hypothetical total PWRS 
reductions at DFSPs by reducing jet fuel variant inventory levels where they are collocated 
with JP-5 stocks. Additionally, nine such DFSPs have F-76 stock collocated with jet fuel 
variants other than JP-5. This means that opportunities may exist at those locations for 
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potential ERQ and PWRS reductions. Table 9 displays commingled fuel DFSPs and is 
derived from the FY20 Inventory Management Plan (IMP) (W. Jakubowicz, email to 
authors, October 23, 2019). The IMP is updated each year and changes in planned 
inventory requirements or wholesale changes in storage locations are infrequent. 
Table 9. Potential inventory reductions by product type and DFSP location. 
  
ERQ PWRS ERQ & PWRS 
F-76/JP-5 Jet variant/JP-5 F-76/Jet variant/JP-5 
CONUS 
Colonial Pipeline DFSP Selma DFSP Craney Island 
DFSP Jacksonville DFSP Houston DFSP Puget Sound 
DFSP Mayport DFSP Selby - 
Miramar Station - - 
DFSP Point Loma - - 
OCONUS 
DFSP Guantanamo Bay St. Theodori Lajes Field* 
Augusta Bay - Rota 
Souda Bay - DFSP Okinawa 
DFSP Fujairah - DFSP Hakozaki 
DFSP Jebel Ali - DFSP Guam 
DFSP Salalah - Wake Island 
DFSP Djibouti - DFSP Pearl Harbor 
DFSP Diego Garcia - - 
DFSP Singapore - - 
DFSP Subic Bay - - 
Sasebo - - 
Marshall Islands - - 
*F-76 & JP-8 
 
Once potential PWRS and ERQ inventory quantity reductions are derived, the costs 
avoided by the elimination of excess contracted tankage and holding costs for fuel savings 
can be calculated per Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-94 guidelines to 
project future budget reductions. 
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3. Storage Transition Costs and Phased Roll-out Plan 
As part of the transition to JP-5, further research is also needed on the total cost and 
timing required to clean, certify and make ready all applicable afloat and ashore fuel 
handling infrastructure. Additionally, cost avoidance and schedule deconfliction methods 
need to be crafted to mitigate budget overruns and a reduction in Ao of fuel storage assets. 
As noted in our Literature Review, CuNi contamination, and potential JFTOT failure 
during A-series testing for combatant fuel downloads into DFSPs prior to DSRAs, are a 
significant issue under SFC conditions. Additionally, entrained water in JP-5 used for ships 
propulsion in F-76 seawater-compensating fuel tanks aboard surface combatants would 
pose the same issue.  
Therefore, future analysis should include the cost of establishing minimal auxiliary 
JP-5 storage for the instances previously stated. Likewise, current shore-based F-76 storage 
tanks or dedicated refueling barges could constitute this auxiliary storage. Under the SFC, 
this JP-5 could not be reloaded into MSC vessels, baring extensive filtration and treatment, 
but could be reserved for in-port loading into surface combatant ship propulsion storage 
tanks. Furthermore, the analysis should identify the most cost-effective method, with the 
least negative impact to maritime operations, by incorporating all planned contracted 
maintenance at DFSPs with currently collocated JP-5 and F-76 stocks and selected 
restricted availabilities for deployable vessels. It is vitally important to implement a phased 
roll-out plan that incorporates a timeline for the drawdown and repositioning of current F-
76 stocks globally. This timeline would be important to DLA Energy contracting time 
horizons for refinery solicitations, as some contracts may require two years from 
requirements planning to product delivery. 
4. Total Fuel Supply System Transition Cost 
Lastly, an initial goal of our research was to analyze the operational impact of the 
SFC on procurement and land-based distribution and storage systems in addition to its 
impact on CLF assets. Unfortunately, we were unable to secure procurement information 
or inventory data for all DFSPs. While we have shown potential operational benefits of 
SFC implementation, this information will significantly alter the primary cost driver for 
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naval fuel consumption, that is, the procurement cost for the fuel itself. Additionally, 
further research is needed to analyze the major potential DoD and contracted infrastructure, 
stock positioning, and global fuel distribution network changes. To do so would first 
require obtaining historical pricing trends from DLA Energy’s primary and frequent JP-5 
refineries or providers. Since 2014, the availability of high quality, light/sweet crude oil 
produced domestically has dramatically increased (EIA, 2019a). Lighter and sweeter 
feeder stocks are more conducive to producing lighter end products, such as kerosene, 
rather than heavier end products, such as fuel oil (EIA, 2019b). Thus, pricing trends in the 
domestic U.S. refining industry must be analyzed to confirm if continued downward 
pressure on the price for kerosene-based products will result from a continued increase of 
appropriate feeder stock supply. Supplemental analysis is also needed to determine if JP-5 
procurement prices would rise, due to the greatly increased annual demand caused by the 
SFC, or would fall due to economies of scale in batching by refineries. 
Secondly, it is assumed that the majority of JP-5 would be refined in the United 
States and transported to OCONUS DFSPs requiring additional T-5 tanker deliveries. If 
the SFC were adopted, any additional T-5 tanker resupplies and associated transportation 
costs would need to be calculated. Through this analysis, a breakeven price could be 
determined that balances procurement versus transportation costs. Once these two areas 
are analyzed, a cost-benefit analysis should be conducted, to include areas of potential 
savings identified within this thesis and in concert with the research results from 
Recommendation 2 and Recommendation 3. We feel this will give a final, and fully scoped 
evaluation of a Single Fuel Concept. 
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